Abstract Cloud computing and poor security issues have quadrupled over the last six years. The alleged presence of backdoors in common encryption ciphers and a system for addressing this problem, is discussed. In 2007, two Microsoft employees gave a presentation "On the Possibility of a backdoor in the NIST SP800-90 Dual Elliptic Curve Pseudo Random Number Generators" which was linked in 2013 by the New York Times with notes leaked by Edward Snowden. This confirmed backdoors were placed, allegedly, in a number of encryption systems by the National Security Agency. If true, it creates an urgent need for personalising the encryption process by generating locally, an unlimited number of the unbreakable one-time pad ciphers. Hybrid random binary sequences generated from chaotic oscillators initialised by natural noise, were exported to an online Javascript application. The online software uses a von Neumann deskewing algorithm to improve the cryptographic strength of the encryptor and also provides an initial statistical p-test for randomness. Encoding the Lenna image by XORing it with the new cipher provided another quick test to observe if any patterns are in the encoded image, otherwise the cipher is subjected to the NIST suite of statistical tests. All designs were simulated in Orcad PSpice c V16.5 prior to prototype construction.
I Introduction: Cloud computing
Protecting information from unwanted interception during transmission dates back thousands of years. During WW11, Churchill and Roosevelt communicated using a secure 1-to-1 One Time Pad (OTP) transatlantic communications system called SIGSALY. This was developed by Bell Labs and Alan Turing and introduced a number of innovative technological systems such as transmitting speech using pulse code modulation and multilevel frequency shift keying [1] . Noise from a mercuryvapour rectifying vacuum valve was added to the voice and spread over a wide frequency band similar to direct spread spectrum communications. This 40 ton encryption system produced unique OTPs recorded on vinyl record which were then carefully distributed. We present a PSpice design for a 40 g electronic device for producing unique OTPs for personal data encryption. By 2017, Global IP traffic is forecast to increase to 1.3 trillion Gigabytes. Such traffic will be subjected to increased security attacks similar to those on the Sony server which made headline news when personal details of famous actors were divulged [3] . Dan Shumow and a Microsoft colleague, Niels Ferguson, gave a talk "On the Possibility of a backdoor in the National Institute of Standards and Technology SP800-90 Dual Elliptic Curve Pseudo Random Number Generators (ECPRNG)" [4] , and in 2013 the New York Times connected this talk with classified Top Secret memos leaked by Edward Snowden [5] .
This confirmed backdoors were placed, allegedly, by the National Security Agency (NSA) in a number of encryption systems as part of a decade-long covert operation undermining the integrity of user security. To address this, a system for generating unlimited unique OTPs to encrypt data locally by the end-user using systems such as OneDrive, Google Drive, Dropbox, is described. Figure 2 outlines our system which incorporates a thresholded chaotic nonlinear oscillator initialised by a natural noise to generate a OTP which is XORed with the data in an online application. The final design comprises several chaos sources but to adhere to conference maximum page guidelines, the discussion is limited to thresholding a single nonlinear Lorenz chaotic oscillator whose initial condition (IC) is a natural noise source, as recommended in [6] .
II Chaos Cryptography
Designing encryptors using pseudo-chaos was proposed by Claude Shannon in a 1945 paper [7] when he mentions with great foresight, the stretching and folding mechanism associated with chaos analogous to confusion and diffusion in encryption. Encoding data using chaos has grown exponentially since 2000 with many chaotic maps used in multi-algorithmic systems encrypting data on a randomised block-by-block basis [8] . Two classes of chaotic oscillators whose ergodicity makes them suitable for encryptor generation were considered:
• Analogue chaotic oscillators such as the Lorenz and Chua,
• Digital chaotic maps such as the logistic and Hénon maps which operate in sampled time.
However, for the reasons stated previously, only the Lorenz system is considered.
a) The Lorenz chaotic oscillator Edward Lorenz, a meteorologist became involved in chaos theory when he attempted to model atmospheric convection and weather patterns. The results were published in a 1963 paper [9] and probably was the first model to demonstrate chaotic behaviour which displayed a sensitivity to initial conditions (SIC). Thresholding the Lorenz oscillator signal around the fixed points produced maximum entropy in the random binary sequences generated. The oscillator was initialised using a natural noise source and hence classified it as a hybrid pseudo-random number generator (HPRNG) [10] .
Any n-th order non-linear differential equation may be expressed as coupled n first-order equations as in equation (1). These are a reduced form of the Navier-Stokes equations and written in integral form to facilitate electronic integrator implementation.
Lorenz used B = 2.666, Prandtl P = 10, R= 28 but slightly different values were determined experimentally using a Web application discussed later, to maximise the OTP entropy. The equations were simulated in PSpice using analogue behavioural model (ABM) parts which were replaced by integrated circuit models at a later stage [11] .
b) Determining the Fixed Points
The thresholding circuit was designed by calculating the values of the fixed points (FP) at the loci centres in the Lorenz strange attractor, v (x ) versus v (z ) in Figure 3 . To find the FP values consider the Jacobian matrix:
The Lorenz model is approximately linear at the origin (x = y= z = 0 corresponds to stationary air masses in the original convective model), hence the Jacobian is rewritten:
The FPs were determined from the characteristic matrix (J -λI ), so, solving the characteristic polynomial yields the system eigenvalues:
The eigenvalues, -2.666, -22.8277, and +11.8277, show the system is unstable at the origin for the positive eigenvalue. The x y coordinates at each lobe centre are the FPs:
Using this equality in the y equation produces:
Substituting the value of z = 27 yields:
The FPs at each lobe centre C 1,2 are computed:
The FPs for the standard Lorenz parameters are ± 8.485 V for z equal to 27 V as shown in Figure  3 . However, scaling the equations for reasonable voltage signal ranges is necessary and changes the FP values and hence the threshold voltage values.
c) Amplitude Scaling
The Lorenz oscillator signal voltage range for the standard parameters, exceeds the normal voltage range of electronic devices and hence scaling x, y and z by 10 is necessary but modifies the equations:
{2.666z − 10xy}dt Component values, Lorenz parameters and scaling factors, are defined in a PARAM part to facilitate investigating parameter variation on encryptor entropy. This part then links component and parameter values to actual values using the nonnumerical operator, {}. For example, the integrator gain is 1/CR, where R is 1 MΩ, means the P parameter is realised by reducing R1 and R2 as {1meg/P }.
The resistances between each multiplier and integrator are scaled by a magnitude scaling factor (MSF ) and the 0.1 AD633 magnitude scaling factor (ASF ), hence the total resistance is {R/ASF /MSF }. Final components are: R1 = R2 = 100 kΩ, R3 = 36.3 kΩ, R4 = 10 kΩ, R5 = 1 MΩ, R6 = 10 kΩ, R7 = 357 kΩ, and C = 50 pF. A detuned FM receiver IC natural noise source added via a large resistor, RIC, sets the initial condition.
III Threshold design
The potential divider R8 and R9 in Figure 5 , together with C 4, adds 4 V DC to the bipolar x signal changing it to unipolar. The thresholding circuit comprises a resistive network, LM339 comparators and a reference voltage, Vref = 1.24 V. The 74121 monostable produces constant width set and reset pulses, with the width time given by 0.69*C 5R15. However, these components are not modelled in PSpice and the pulse width is set as an external model parameter. The FP threshold voltages ± 0.848 V adds to the 4 V DC shift to yield 3.15 V and 4.84 V, so that for a total resistance of 1 MΩ and Vref = 1.24 V, the components were calculated:
This yields R12 = 256 kΩ. Similarly for R11:
Resulting in R11 = 138 kΩ and R10 = 607 kΩ. These non-preferred values were realised in the prototype using miniature multi-turn potentiometers. The constant width monostable set and reset pulses displayed in Figure 6 are combined by the NOR gates forming an SR latch giving a nonreturn-to zero (NRZ) format to the OTP. The set and reset pulses never overlap and is a property exploited in the software algorithm in the next section. The butterfly strange attractor in Figure 8 shows the set and reset pulses superimposed at the loci thus correlating with the previous figure. The monostable pulses cannot, however, be superimposed on the attractor. 
IV Exporting data from PSpice
Exporting PSpice analogue signals using copy and paste does not work for digital data. Instead, binary signals are exported using Vector1 parts which specify the directory location and file name. Assigning the same file name to each vector1 parts attached to the monostable set and reset output lines automatically combines these outputs into a dibit pair forming a column vector in the output file. Table 1 shows part of a vector1 file output from PSpice with header rows and time-voltage vectors. The time vector is not outputted monotonically increasing but shows transitions only. The Javascript application however, ignores the time vector and an algorithm concatenates the set and reset bit streams to form the OTP. The first bit of the second column is the set value and the second is the reset pulse value. The goal was to ignore the temporal information and remove the dibit 00 and 11 pairs-states that should never happen. This leaves 10 or 01, of which the first bit is processed to combine the two data streams into a single OTP column stream as displayed in Figure 9 . In this example, the final OTP when XORed with the pixel array data from the test bitmap image, Lenna, produced the encoded image as shown. A single statistical p-test is also displayed and gives an initial indication of randomness. A biased OTP was produced by running a short simulation to demonstrate undesirable patterns in the encrypted image. Another useful feature applies the Von Neumann de-skewing algorithm to pairs of data (dibit) and rejects all 00 and 11 dibit pairs [12] . This removes any bias from the bit stream which would otherwise be observed in the encrypted image. However, the algorithm is inefficient as 75 percent of data is lost in the process. The VN algorithm should be applied to two uncorrelated data streams but this is addressed in the final circuit by XORing two chaos independent data streams from Lorenz and Chua oscillators. However, for this paper we apply the algorithm to the Lorenz data only which is exported from the application as a text file.
V Testing the One-Time-Pad
The cryptographic strength of the OTP was evaluated by subjecting it to the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) suite of tests [13] . These tests comprise parameter and nonparameter tests but the OTPs from simulation were limited to non-parameter tests because it was not practical to run the parameter tests which require several million bits in length. Table 2 shows the OTP passed those NIST tests which required file sizes less than one million bits. However, the final circuit will be tested thoroughly. The online software has a p-test which allows for experimenting on the effects of Lorenz system parameters changes on cipher entropy. It was found that B = 2.8, P = 11, and R= 27.5 produced maximum entropy in the OTP. The OTP was also subjected to an autocorrelation test which displayed a single Kronecker delta function as in Figure 10 showing no statistical bias [14] . The OTP also displayed an infinite uniform power spectral density (PSD) plot, together with positive Lyapunov exponents (LE) thus ensuring chaos was initiated [15] . Another measure of randomness, which essentially is the Shannon entropy, is the Kolmogorov complexity (KC) created simultaneously by Andrey Kolmogorov and Ray Solmonoff. This specifies the minimum length to which a string of binary digits is compressed [16] . For certain phase space conditions, Brudno's theorem states that the Kolmogorov-Sinai entropy (KSE) is the algorithmic complexity (AC) over all the trajectories [17] and Pesin's theorem relates to the KSE by summing the positive LEs.
VI Conclusions
Poor security in cloud computing is growing exponentially and our solution was to personalise the encryption process by creating OTPs. Ultimately, this solution gives greater control and complete confidence to the end user security because the OTP is the only proven unbreakable cipher-provided it is used only once. This condition is met however as a new OTP is generated each time new data is uploaded to the cloud. Designing encryptor circuits for chaos cryptography is made considerably easier and is more time efficient by simulating in the first instance, all aspects of the design procedure [18] and the resultant HPRNG circuit produces OTPs that passes the NIST international randomness tests.
The Javascript application software linked with the PSpice simulation environment and had useful features such as a von Neumann algorithm to improve cipher entropy and a single statistical test for investigating the effect of parameter variation on randomness (Software is available at [19] ). At the time of paper submission, a prototype circuit was produced that matched all the simulation results. It is expected that the final PCB circuit using several chaos sources initialised by a natural noise source, will passes all the NIST randomness tests.
